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Wife's Action for Loss of Consortium
Keith E. Spero*
C ONSORTIUM HAS BEEN DEFINED as one's right to conjugal fellowship
and relations with his spouse, and to her company, cooperation and
assistance in the marital relationship as a partner in the family unit. Its
loss by a husband has long been recognized as compensable if brought
about by either the negligent or intentional wrongdoing of another. An
action by a husband for loss of consortium allows him to seek recovery
for the loss of, or the impaired ability of his wife to perform her usual
services in the care of the home, as well as for his loss of her society,
companionship and comfort.
Common sense would seem to dictate that if a husband has these
rights with respect to his wife, the wife would have similar rights to her
husband's consortium. In the past, however, most jurisdictions allowed
the wife to maintain an action for damages to compensate for her loss of
her husband's consortium only if the loss was brought about by an inten-
tional or malicious act.1 Typical of those types of actions in which a wife
was permitted to recover is an action for alienation of affections.
Legal writers have long maintained that a wife should be allowed to
bring an action for loss of consortium, even though the injury to her hus-
band was due to the negligence-as opposed to the intentional miscon-
duct-of the defendant. Most courts have traditionally held, however,
that a wife has no such cause of action, advancing such reasons as a fear
that the injury to the wife is too remote or indirect, that to allow the
action would result in a double recovery to husband and wife for the
same injury, and that since a wife has no legal right to her husband's
services, she can have no claim for loss of conjugal affection and social
comfort. Still other courts argue that since a wife had no such right
of action at common law, she still has none, despite the passage of the
Married Women's Acts, since those statutes merely removed disabilities
but created no new rights in women.
In recent years an ever-increasing number of more liberal courts
have taken the view that a wife should have the same right of action for
loss of consortium as her husband, rejecting each of the old arguments
with logic and an appreciation of the existing realities of the modern
world and of the relationship between the sexes.
One of the landmark cases illuminating the path toward what the
legal writers would call the enlightened view is Hitafler v. Argonne Co.,
*Of the Cleveland, Ohio bar.
1 Annot., 5 A.L.R. 1049 (1920); 59 A.L.R. 680 (1929); 27 Am. Jur., Husband and Wife
§ 513, at 113 (1940).
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Inc.,' which clearly held that a wife-deprived of her husband's aid,
assistance, enjoyment and sexual relations by an injury to his person
resulting from another's negligence-can maintain an action for loss of
consortium, regardless of whether such loss is accompanied by a loss of
services. The court ruled that there is more to consortium than mere
services of a spouse:
Beyond that there are the so called sentimental elements to which
the wife has a right for which there should be a remedy.
3
The court methodically struck down each of the outdated arguments
against a wife's right of action, holding that the rights of the parties to
a marriage are mutual and are equally entitled to protection of the law.
The argument against "double recovery" was recognized as one which
could be satisfactorily met by requiring that a husband's recovery of
damages for impairment of his ability to support his wife must be taken
into account in determining the amount of the wife's damages.
In 1957 the Supreme Court of Arkansas heard Missouri Pacific
Transportation Co. v. Miller,4 in which a wife sought damages to com-
pensate her for the loss of her husband's consortium following a collision
between a bus on which he was a passenger and a truck. She claimed
that the vehicles were driven negligently and that as a result of that
negligence, her husband was permanently paralyzed in both legs, and
permanently injured in other respects to such an extent as to be unable
to have sexual relations, attend church, be superintendent of the Sunday
School, take care of his children, tend the garden, or help his wife cook
or maintain the house. There was no statute in Arkansas specifically
providing a wife with the right to bring an action for loss of consortium.
The Arkansas Supreme Court reasoned, however, that since a wife was
allowed to recover for loss of consortium as a result of an intentional
tort, there was no sound reason for denying her compensation merely
because the action was based upon negligence. The Court, in its opinion,
noted twenty two cases which were contra to the Hitaffer case. It re-
jected these cases and relied upon Hitaffer and cases from the District of
2 Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., Inc., 183 F. 2d 811 cert. denied 340 U.S. 852 (1950). The
Hitaffer case was overruled in part by Smither and Company Inc. v. Coles, 242 F. 2d
220, cert. denied 354 U.S. 914 (1957). The Court held that the wife of an injured em-
ployee was barred from maintaining an action against his employer for loss of con-
sortium as a result of injuries sustained by the employee while working for an em-
ployer, on the ground that the employer was negligent. The Longshoremen's and
Harbor Worker's Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 905 states that the liability of the
employer was exclusive and in place of all other liability, under the statute. The
court held that the statute was comprehensive and barred an action when the em-
ployee was covered under the Act. The basic holding on the Hitaffer case that the
wife has an action for loss of consortium due to a negligent injury to her husband
was not overruled, and is the present state of the law for employees not covered
under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
3 Id. at 814.
4 227 Ark. 351, 299 S.W. 2d 41 (1957).
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Columbia, 5 Mississippi, CaliforniaJ Iowa,8 and Georgia 9 which have fol-
lowed the Hitaffer doctrine.
In 1961 a Delaware trial court refused to grant defendant's motion
to dismiss a wife's claim for loss of her husband's consortium allegedly
suffered as a result of defendant's negligence.' 0 The trial judge rejected
dictum to the contrary found in earlier Delaware cases, and held that
"since a husband has a remedy for loss of consortium through negligent
injury to his wife, it must logically follow that she has a like remedy." 11
This decision was later mentioned with apparent approval in dictum by
the Delaware Supreme Court in Stenta v. Leblang.12
In Walden v. Coleman,13 the Georgia Court of Appeals held:
It is now recognized in this State that a wife has an independent
cause of action for the loss of consortium of her husband due to a
tortious injury inflicted upon him, although she may not in such
action recover any item of damages which would be a proper item
of damages in an action directly by the husband.1
4
The Ohio View
In 1915 the Supreme Court of Ohio was confronted with a case in
which a wife attempted to recover damages for the loss of her husband's
consortium but not for the loss of his services. The injuries to her hus-
band were occasioned by the negligence of the defendant and not by
defendant's intentional misconduct. The Court held in Smith v. Nicholas
Bldg. Co.,' 5 that she could not separate a claim for loss of her husband's
sentimental, social and marital contributions from a claim for loss of
services. The two aspects of such a claim, one encompassing a remedy
for the invasion of the sentimental side of the marriage relationship, and
the other dealing with the loss of the husband's services, were thought
to be bound together in the absence of a statute allowing them to be
made into two separate causes of action. The court went on to hold that
where the husband's injuries were caused by defendant's negligence as
opposed to an intentional or malicious act, the wife could not maintain
an action for loss of consortium. The husband's right to recover dam-
5 Cooney v. Moomaw, 109 F. Supp. 448 (D.C. 1953).
6 Delta Chevrolet Company v. Waid, 211 Miss. 256, 51 So. 2d 443 (1951).
7 Gist v. French, 136 Cal. App. 2d 247, 288 P. 2d 1003 (1955). This case overruled on
other grounds in 6 Ca. R. 294, 328 P. 2d 451, 353 P. 2d 934 (1958).
8 Acuff v. Schmit, 248 Iowa 272, 78 N.W. 2d 480 (1956).
9 Brown v. Georgia-Tennessee Coaches, 88 Ga. App. 519, 77 S.E. 2d 24 (1953).
10 Yonner v. Adams, 167 A. 2d 717 (Super. Ct. Del. 1961).
11 Id. at 726.
12 185 A. 2d 759 (Del. 1962).
13 105 Ga. App. 242, 124 S.E. 2d 313 (1962).
14 Id. at 315, 124 S.E. 2d at 314.
15 93 Ohio St. 101 (1915).
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ages was thought to be sufficient since his cause of action would entitle
him to seek full compensation for the impairment of his physical powers
and for the diminution of his earning capacity and ability to support his
wife.
This 1915 decision was thought to be the Ohio view until quite re-
cently when Ohio courts, realizing that it was unfair to allow a husband
to recover for loss of his wife's consortium while denying that same
right to a wife, began to abandon the old rule. In Clem v. Brown, 6 de-
fendant filed a motion to strike from a wife's petition her claim that as
a result of the defendant's negligence, her husband was injured and she
lost his services and consortium. The Judge of the Common Pleas Court
of Paulding County held that the old reasons underlying the common
law denial of the wife's right to damages in such a case were no longer
valid. After setting forth the various reasons used to support the old
common law theories, Judge Hitcock said:
Given the premises, we may admire this precise reasoning after the
manner of Aristotle and Euclid but my observations in the days of
my bachelorhood and through nearly a quarter century of marriage
to one woman tell me these premises have in Ohio been extinct for
several generations.1"
The Court went on to overrule that part of the motion seeking to strike
out her claim for loss of consortium, and held that under the equal pro-
tection clause of the United States Constitution, a wife has a cause of
action for loss of consortium for the negligent injury to her husband.
It seems evident to me there are today no factual differences justi-
fying a continuation of the Ohio rule denying only to wives and not
to husbands a cause of action for loss of consortium caused by negli-
gent injury occasioned one's spouse.' s
However, under the theory that the husband had both the duty to sup-
port his wife and the opportunity in his own lawsuit to claim damages
for any impairment of his ability to perform that duty, Judge Hitchcock
sustained that part of the motion to strike seeking to strike out a claim
for loss of the husband's services.
Cler v. Brown therefore represents the first inroad into the old
theory denying recovery in Ohio to wives whose husbands were negli-
gently injured. Mrs. Clem at the trial court level at least accomplished
in 1965 precisely what Mrs. Smith tried and failed to attain in 1915.
The Clem case of 1965 was followed by the case of Umpleby v. Dor-
sey.19 A policeman's wife brought an action in the Stark County Com-
mon Pleas Court for Twenty Thousand Dollars damages against a motor-
16 3 Ohio Misc. 167, 207 N.E. 2d 398 (1965).
17 Id. at 172, 207 N.E. 2d at 401.
18 Id.
19 10 Ohio Misc. 288, 227 N.E. 2d 274 (1967).
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ist who she claimed negligently ran down and injured her husband, de-
priving her of his "love, services, conjugal relations, and consortium."
The defendant filed a demurrer and the Common Pleas Court overruled
it, holding:
The Ohio Rule that a husband may recover for the loss of the con-
sortium of his wife caused by negligence, but that a wife may not
recover for the loss of the consortium of her husband caused by
negligence, constitutes discrimination which is so unjustifiable as to
be violative of due process of law, contrary to the 14th Amendment
to the United States Constitution. 20
The trial court, Judge Putman, pointed out that the old Ohio Rule "deny-
ing a woman recovery under these circumstances was founded upon the
concept that a woman was neither the social nor civil equal of her hus-
band." In the court's words, "this distinction bears no relationship to
fact and today is not even recognized by legal fiction. It is the essence
of arbitrary discrimination and the antithesis of equal protection." 21
Umpleby therefore allowed the wife to sue for both loss of services
and loss of consortium, while the Clem case allowed the wife to sue for
loss of consortium alone, without allowing her claim for loss of services.
Ohio has long allowed a wife's claim for loss of her husband's con-
sortium to be brought independent of a claim for loss of services, so long
as the action was founded upon an intentional or malicious tort.22 In
Flandermeyer v. Cooper,23 the Ohio Supreme Court recognized a certain
equality between the sexes and held:
Husband and wife are entitled to the affection, society, cooperation
and aid of each other in every conjugal relation, and either may
maintain an action for damages against anyone who wrongfully and
maliciously interferes with the marital relationship and thereby de-
prives one of the society, affection and consortium of the other. 24
It is only when the wife's action is founded upon negligence that an
inequality is recognized, as exemplified in Smith25 which held that loss
of consortium and loss of services were bound together and could not be
separated so as to allow a loss of consortium action independent of a
claim for loss of services.
In 1966 the Lake County Court of Appeals was presented with an
appeal from the Common Pleas Court, which had sustained a demurrer
to a petition brought by a wife, founded upon negligence, claiming dam-
ages for loss of consortium due to the injury of her husband. The wife
20 Id. at 290, 227 N.E. 2d at 276.
21 Id. at 289, 227 N.E. 2d at 275.
22 Flandermeyer vs. Cooper, 85 Ohio St. 327 (1912).
23 Ibid.
24 Id. at 327.
25 Supra, note 15.
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appellant asked the Court of Appeals to determine that Smith v. Nich-
olas Building Company2" was no longer the law of Ohio. Three judges
of the Ninth Ohio Appellate District, sitting by designation in the Sev-
enth District (Lake County) heard the case and decided not to decide
the question presented, ruling:
This Court does not believe that a subordinate court should decide
so important a policy matter. We must, on the authority of the above
named case, sustain the judgment of the trial court.2 7
Within eighteen months of that decision, two other decisions were ren-
dered by Ohio Courts of Appeals in Franklin2 and Lake29 counties. In
both cases wives had filed actions for loss of consortium resulting from
negligent injury to their husbands, and demurrers were sustained by the
trial courts. In each case, the decision of the trial court was reversed and
each case was remanded for further proceedings. In the Franklin County
case, Leffier,3 0 Presiding Judge Duffey analyzed the 1915 Smith decision,
noted that it considered loss of consortium to be incidental to loss of
services rather than an independent recoverable item of damages, but
went on to observe that:
... regardless of whether it be incidental or independent, the com-
mon law of Ohio does recognize loss of consortium as an item of
damages recoverable by a husband.
If a statute were to affirmatively create such a right in a husband
and yet deny it to a wife, such a classification based upon sex alone
would violate Article I of the Constitution of Ohio and the Four-
teenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The
common-law distinction between husband and wife in regard to con-
sortium is equally based upon an unreasonable, discredited concept
of the subservience of the wife to her husband. The courts should
not perpetuate in the common law a discrimination that could not
constitutionally be created by statute.
In our opinion, loss of consortium is an item of damages to a wife
exactly to the same extent as to the husband. We hold that her legal
rights to recover are equal to those of her husband.
31
The Durham32 case, decided a few months later by the Lake County
Court of Appeals, in considering Smith observed that in 1915 the Ohio
Supreme Court felt that the husband's loss of a wife's conjugal society,
companionship and association was a natural and foreseeable conse-
26 Ibid.
27 Ganoe v. Stoner, No. 837 (Lake Co. Ct. App.) 1966, an unreported decision.
28 Leffler v. Wiley, 15 Ohio App. 2d 67 (1968).
29 Durham v. Gabriel, No. 905 (Lake Co. Ct. App.), July 8, 1968, to date an un-
reported decision.
30 Supra, Note 28.
31 Id. at 68.
32 Supra, Note 29.
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quence of a negligent act but that such a loss suffered by a wife was not.
The Court of Appeals felt that this was an evidentiary matter and
should not be decided as a matter of law on the basis of sex. Moreover,
the opinion quoted Judge Duffey in Lefflier in rejecting the theory that
loss of consortium must be incidental to loss of services.
It is obvious that the question should and probably will soon be re-
considered and resolved by the Ohio Supreme Court. Hopefully the
more enlightened view, as represented by Clem, Umpleby, Leffler and
Durham in Ohio will prevail.
Conclusion
The 14th Amendment argument requiring application of the equal
protection clause seems to the writer to be one which will be persuasive
to many courts confronted with this question in the future. The current
trend of case law seems to increasingly support the rule that a wife is
entitled to "equal protection" under the law and that therefore, like her
husband, is entitled to maintain an action for loss of consortium based
upon negligence 3 Whether or not the state supreme courts wish to
recognize the right of a wife to maintain an action for loss of consortium
in a negligence case, in the final analysis, they may have to do so.
In recent years, we have seen a number of cases decided by the
United States Supreme Court which have affirmatively changed state
law so as to conform with federal standards of due process and equal
protection under the 14th Amendment. The areas in which state court
judges must follow federal concepts are expanding and consortium may
well be included. In the words of Judge Putman of the Common Pleas
Court of Stark County, Ohio:
Our courts now receive with open arms the confessed rapist; appoint
him a lawyer; hear his case, grant him his remedy; turn him loose
upon the streets, under certain circumstances where he has been
denied the equal protection and due process of law.
Are these same courts to close their doors, without a hearing, upon
the married woman who claims damages for loss of her right to
achieve motherhood within the marriage relationship?
The conclusion is inescapable.
The equal protection of laws and the right to due process of law are
not reserved to those accused of crime, but apply to all citizens in
their civil actions.
33 Missouri-Pacific Transportation Co. v. Miller, supra note 4; Luther v. Maple, 250
F. 2d 916 (8th Cir. 1958); Brown v. Georgia-Tennessee Coaches Inc., supra note 9;
Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ii1. 2d 406, 170 N.E. 2d 881 (1960); Acuff v. Schmit, supra note 8;
Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich. 33, 101 N.W. 2d 227 (1960); Duffy v. Lipsman-
Fulkerson & Co., 200 F. Supp. 71; Cooney v. Moomaw, supra note 5; Ekalo v. Con-
structive Service Corp., 46 N.J. 82, 215 A. 2d 1 (1965); Smith v. Smith, 205 Ore. 286,
287 P. 2d 572 (1955); Mariani v. Narri, 185 A. 2d 119 (1962); Hoekstra v. Hegeland,
78 S.D. 82, 98 N.W. 2d 669 (1959); Sove v. Smith, 311 F. 2d 5 (6th Cir. 1962).
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The due process of law which now requires the state court to free
the confessed killer, robber and rapist, where denied, cannot permit
a state court rule requiring a law-abiding citizen to lose in state
court because of the sole fact that she is a woman.
34
In Owen v. Illinois Baking Corporation,35 a U. S. District Court in
Michigan held that to deny a wife the right to sue for loss of consortium
while permitting such suit to her husband is to deny the wife her right to
equal protection under the 14th Amendment. The Court refused to set
aside a $5,000 judgment rendered in the wife's favor as compensation to
her for her loss of her husband's consortium suffered when her husband
was injured in an auto accident. Her husband received $30,000 in a com-
panion case for his own injuries. Defendant argued that (1) under
Indiana law, a wife could not maintain an action for loss of consortium
based upon negligence and cited Indiana authority to that effect; (2)
the accident occurred in Indiana and under the Erie Doctrine the court
must therefore follow the law of Indiana. The District Court held that
while Indiana law did not allow the action, and that although under the
Erie Doctrine federal courts are bound to follow the substantive law of
the states in diversity cases, it would not in this case because "where
a federal question is presented, the court does not look to state law, but
to federal law as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court." 36
The following year the same question arose in a U. S. District Court
case in Illinois when a wife sought recovery for loss of consortium after
her husband had been rendered sexually impotent following an auto-
train collision resulting from the alleged negligence of the railroad. In
Karczewski v. The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company37 the law of
Indiana was once again involved since the train wreck occurred in that
state. In a very well reasoned and detailed opinion, Judge Marovitz held
that to follow the Indiana law which discriminated against women in
such situations would be a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and
accordingly, the defendant's motion for summary judgment was denied.
A contrary view was taken recently by a U. S. District Court in
Ohio in the case of Copeland v. Smith Dairy Products Co. 38 in which
the court decided that no Fourteenth Amendment violation was involved
in following the Ohio Supreme Court decision of Smith v. Nicholas
Building Co. 39 denying a wife the right to sue for loss of consortium in
a negligence action. The trial judge reasoned that in Ohio:
34 Supra note 19.
35 260 F. Supp. 820 (N.D. Mich. 1966).
36 Porter Royalty Pool Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 165 F. 2d 933 (6th
Cir. 1948) cert. denied 334 U.S. 833 (1960).
3T 274 F. Supp. 169 (1967).
38 15 Ohio Misc. 43 (N.D. Ohio 1968).
39 Supra, Note 15.
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol17/iss3/7
17 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (3)
(a) A husband cannot sue in negligence for loss of consortium
unless he also claims and proves loss of services, since the two are
bound together;
(b) A wife cannot bring an action for loss of her husband's
"services" because those "services" belong to the husband alone and
he alone can sue for his inability to render them;
(c) Since a wife cannot sue for loss of services, she, like a hus-
band who for some reason could not prove loss of his wife's services,
cannot maintain a negligence action for loss of consortium alone.
(d) Since both husband and wife are denied the right to bring
a loss of consortium action independent of a loss of services action,
they are treated alike and to deny wife this right of action is not to
deny her equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
The trial judge did not think it a denial of equal protection for Ohio
law to maintain that in a negligence case, there are never circumstances
in which a wife could sue for loss of consortium, but that there are cir-
cumstances in which a husband may recover for loss of consortium (by
including a loss of services claim). The court seemed to suggest that it
was not unequal protection of law to deny a wife the right to sue for the
loss which she herself suffers when her husband cannot provide services
for her although the husband has this right if his wife is injured. In the
words of the trial judge:
The "rights of man" would not be furthered if these claims of the
husband were to be split off to give the wife the right to claim loss
of her husband's services.
4 0
When one considers that to deny the wife the right to recover for loss
of her husband's services also apparently denies her the right to recover
for loss of consortium as well, it is obvious that the protection of the law
is not equally extended to them.
The rule that in a negligence action loss of consortium must be tied
to a loss of service claim is artificial and meaningless when one con-
siders that it does not apply to an action involving an intentional tort.
Its only result is to deny a wife relief afforded to a husband. On the
other hand, should this rule be maintained, then to deny a wife the right
to bring a loss of service action and therefore a loss of consortium action
as well, achieves the same result. Copeland did indicate that possibly
these rules should be re-evaluated by the Supreme Court of Ohio, but
unlike other U. S. District Courts that have considered State laws con-
taining such anachronisms, found they did not result in unequal pro-
tection of the law, and therefore dismissed Mrs. Copeland's action for
loss of her husband's services, help, and assistance and marital con-
sortium.
40 Supra, Note 38 at 46.
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In the opinion of this writer, a denial of the wife's right of action
is arbitrary and a relic of the past, existing without reasonable justifi-
cation. If such a case is ever reviewed by the U. S. Supreme Court, it
will not be surprising if the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
argument proves effective. In such an eventuality, no amount of legal-
istic reasoning, embracing artificial distinctions found in State law, will
be sufficient to prevent a wife from suing for loss of consortium in a
negligence case.
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